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"Proceeding at Your Own Risk": Evaluating a
New Principle of International Law for
Provisional Measures
Shouvik Bhattacharyat
In Passage Through the Great Belt, Finland requested the International
Court of Justice to issue provisional measures preventing Denmark from
constructing a bridge that could lead to an abridgment of Finnish ships' rights
of free passage through the Great Belt.' The ICJ denied Finland's request for
interim orders, and in so doing made a pointed note that "in principle ... if it is
established that the construction of works involves an infringement of a legal
right, the possibility cannot and should not be excluded a priori of a judicial
finding that such works must not be continued or must be modified or
dismantled." 2 Twenty years later, this statement would be institutionalized as "a
principle of international law" in an arbitration proceeding between India and
Pakistan.
Through a request dated May 17, 2010, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan
initiated arbitration proceedings against the Republic of India under the Indus
Waters Treaty of 1960.3 The dispute centered on India's construction of the
Kishenganga Hydroelectric Project (KHEP) that Pakistan claimed violated its
rights under the Treaty.4 Pakistan subsequently requested provisional measures
under Paragraph 28 of Annexure G of the Treaty5 on June 6, 2011,6 asking the
Arbitration Panel to enjoin any further construction on the KHEP until the
Panel's award at the merits stage. Pakistan also asked the Panel to declare that
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1. Passage Through the Great Belt (Fin. v. Den.), Provisional Measures Order, 1991 I.C.J. 12,
17 (July 29).
2. Id. T 3 1.
3. Indus Waters Treaty 1960, India-Pak., Sept. 19, 1960, 419 U.N.T.S. 125.
4. See Indus Waters Kishenganga Arbitration (Pak. v. India), Interim Protection Order, $ 6
(Perm. Ct. Arb. June 6, 2011), http://www.pca-cpa.org/showfile.asp?fil id=1 726 [hereinafter Kishenganga
Order].
5. Paragraph 28 of Annexure G provides in relevant part:
Either Party may request the Court at its first meeting to lay down, pending its Award, such
interim measures as, in the opinion of that Party, are necessary to safeguard its interests under
the Treaty with respect to the matter in dispute, or to avoid prejudice to the final solution or
aggravation or extension of the dispute.
Indus Waters Treaty, supra note 3, at 220.
6. Kishenganga Order, supra note 4, $ 34.
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"[a]ny steps India has taken or may take in respect of the KHEP are taken at its
own risk and without prejudice to the possibility that the Panel may in its
decision on the merits order that the works must not be continued or must be
modified or dismantled."7  The latter is Pakistan's restatement of what it
repeatedly referred to over the course of the arbitration proceedings as the
"proceed at your own risk" principle of international law, which it claimed to
derive from the Great Belt case. By an order dated September 23, 2011, the
Kishenganga Order, the Panel granted Pakistan partial relief and enjoined India
from constructing the dam portion of the planned project.9 As to the remaining
parts of the project, while the Panel did not formally declare further provisional
measures, it stated that "the continuation of such activity is appropriately
governed by the 'proceed at your own risk' principle of international law"'0 and
thereby implicitly-functionally-granted Pakistan's latter demand as well.
The Panel here declared a hitherto unarticulated principle of international
law. After repeatedly framing the principle of risk allocation-the "proceed at
your own risk" principle-only in terms of the articulation given to it by
Pakistan,11 the Panel became the first body to adopt it as "a principle of
international law."l 2  Central to this declaration was India's own
acknowledgment on the last day of the hearings that the "proceed at your own
risk" principle governed its construction work on the KHEP.' 3 Pakistan and
India's acquiescence to a principle, however, should not bind the international
community.
The Kishenganga Panel was headed by an ex-President of the ICJ
(Chairman Schwebel), and included the current ICJ president (Judge Tomka)
and a recently retired ICJ Judge (Judge Simma) amongst its membership.
Therefore it is highly probable that the panel's endorsement of this principle of
international law in the Kishenganga Order will have wide implications for the
entire international community beyond the Kishenganga arbitration.
The institutionalization of the "proceed at your own risk" principle in the
Kishenganga Order, I argue, is an example of how provisional measures can be
abused.14 In this Comment, I am not concerned with whether the Kishenganga





11. See, e.g., id. 165 ("Pakistan invoked the principle (considered by Pakistan to be one of
international law) applied by the [ICJ] in the Passage through the Great Belt case that 'a state engaged
in works that may violate the rights of another state can proceed only at its own risk."' (emphasis
added)); id. T 122 ("The content of that principle is expressed by Pakistan, on the basis of the ICJ's
Passage Through the Great Belt provisional measures order, to be as follows: 'a State engaged in works
that may violate the rights of another State can proceed only at its own risk."' (emphasis added)); id.
T 143 ("In the Court's view, the continuation of such activity is appropriately governed by the 'proceed
at own risk' principle of international law . . .
12. See id. T 143.
13. See id.
14. While the "proceed at your own" risk principle may come to accrue significance in all
kinds of cases, I analyze it only as applied to contested construction activity, as in the Kishenganga and
Great Belt cases.
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"incorrect." Rather, the focus is on the principles guiding the decisions about
provisional measures and how they can be framed to best balance the necessity
of provisional measures against the potential for abuse. To this end, this
Comment critically examines the "proceed at your own risk" principle,
including not only its claim to being a "principle of international law," but also
its efficacy and utility as a guiding principle for provisional measures in the
international adjudication of contested construction activities. It concludes that
the principle is far from a good conduit for balancing both parties' interests
against abuse. In particular, in the context of bodies like the ICJ that base their
jurisdiction on the consent of the two parties, the "proceed at your own risk"
principle allows the Court, and indeed any applicant for provisional measures,
to impose an unprecedented coercive force through the very application for
provisional measures. In addition to the Kishenganga Order, this Comment
limits itself to considering the jurisprudence of the ICJ, where litigating
provisional measures has become increasingly popular.
In the 1980s there were only three requests for provisional measures at
the ICJ, two of which were granted.16 The number of requests increased to ten
in the next decade, and in five cases provisional measures were granted.17 Since
2000, eleven more such requests have been made, of which five have been
granted. The corresponding scholarship has followed suit. While writing
about provisional measures has attracted scholarly attention from the early days
of the Permanent Court of International Justice,19 in the last decade there
20
appears to have been a veritable explosion of work on provisional measures.
This Comment, therefore, joins an already lively conversation.
This Comment proceeds in four parts. Part I provides an overview of
provisional measures in the ICJ. Part II turns to the problem of compliance with
provisional measures and discusses the potential for their abuse. Part III
15. The Panel issued its partial award on February 18, 2013, in which it lifted its provisional
measures after declaring that, subject to the restrictions of the final award, India had a right to build the
KHEP under the Indus Waters Treaty. One might argue, then, that the provisional measures were
"incorrect." The Indus Waters Kishenganga Arbitration (Pak. v. India), Partial Award, 201 (Perm. Ct.
Arb. 2013), http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pagid=1392.
16. For a detailed listing of all provisional measure cases brought to the ICJ and how they
were resolved, see MEHMET SEMIH GEMALMAZ, PROVISIONAL MEASURES OF PROTECTION IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: 1907-2010, at 142-48 (2011).
17. Id.
18. Id. Since the publication of Gemalmaz's book, the ICJ has granted provisional measures in
two cases. See Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 15 June 1962 in the Case Concerning
Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thai.), Provisional Measures Order, T 69 (July 18, 2011),
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/151/16564.pdf; Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the
Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicar.), Provisional Measures Order, $ 86 (Mar. 8, 2011), http://www.icj
-cij.org/docket/files/150/16324.pdf.
19. See, e.g., EDWARD DUMBAULD, INTERIM MEASURES OF PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL
CONTROVERSIES (1932).
20. See, e.g., GEMALMAZ, supra note 16; CLARA BURANO HERRARA, PROVISIONAL
MEASURES IN THE CASE LAW OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2010); EVA RIETER,
PREVENTING IRREPARABLE HARM: PROVISIONAL MEASURES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
ADJUDICATION (2010); SHABTAI ROSENNE, PROVISIONAL MEASURES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE LAW OF THE SEA
(2005).
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critically examines the "proceed at your own risk" rule as a principle of
international law and suggests a possible way forward. Part IV concludes with
the hope that the Kishenganga Order is the first and last articulation of the
"proceed at your own risk" principle as one of international law.
I. PROVISIONAL MEASURES IN THE ICJ: AN OVERVIEW
In Jerzy Sztucki's definitive 1983 study, Interim Measures in the Hague
Court,21 he describes provisional measures (also called interim orders) as "an
integral part of the judicial peace-keeping machinery." 22 Broadly, in the
international arena provisional measures are primarily exercised for two
purposes, both of which are "measures to preserve a status quo pendente lite."23
First, as in the domestic context, interim protections are provided for the
preservation of contested rights.24 Article 41 of the ICJ statute explicitly allows
for provisional measures to serve this purpose, but is silent on the issue of
whether or not provisional measures can be used to safeguard the judgment on
the merits.25 However, the then-President of the Court Jimdnez de Ar6chaga
laid the latter question to rest when he wrote in 1976 that "[tihe essential object
of provisional measures is to ensure that the execution of a future judgment on
the merits shall not be frustrated by the actions of one party pendente lite."26
Second, interim measures are also used to prevent the aggravation of disputes.27
While the ICJ statute is again mute on this issue, treaties such as the Indus
Waters Treaty specifically provide for such a justification for provisional
28
measures.
The broad language of Article 41 of the ICJ statute is far from instructive
on the legal requirements of a successful application for provisional measures.
Specifically, given that the very possibility of international adjudication is
founded on the consent of the two or more nations party to any particular
dispute, the ICJ statute is deafeningly silent on the jurisdictional requirements
for provisional measures. A respondent state almost always invokes a challenge
21. JERZY SZTUCKI, INTERIM MEASURES IN THE HAGUE COURT 1 (1983); see also LaGrand
(Ger. v. U.S.), Provisional Measures Order, 1999 I.C.J. 9, 16 (Mar. 3) (separate opinion of President
Schwebel) (identifying Sztucki's book as "the most authoritative work in the field").
22. SZTUCKI, supra note 21, at 1.
23. Id. at 12.
24. See id.; see also, e.g., Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981) ("The
purpose of a preliminary injunction is merely to preserve the relative positions of the parties until a trial
on the merits can be held.").
25. Article 41 in its entirety reads:
1. The Court shall have the power to indicate, if it considers that circumstances so require, any
provisional measures which ought to be taken to preserve the respective rights of either party.
2. Pending the final decision, notice of the measures suggested shall forthwith be given to the
parties and to the Security Council.
Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 41, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 993.
26. Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turk.), Interim Protection Order, 1976 I.C.J. 3,
16 (Sept. I1) (separate opinion of President Jimdnez de Arechaga); see, e.g., Kishenganga Order, supra
note 4, at 41 n.209.
27. See SZTUCKI, supra note 21, at 12.
28. See Indus Waters Treaty, supra note 3.
514
"Proceeding at Your Own Risk"
to the ICJ's jurisdiction under Article 36 of the statute.29 For the applicant to
receive the benefits of interim protection without having conclusively
established jurisdiction in the first place appears patently inequitable. On the
other hand, requests for provisional measures are frequently of such an urgent
nature that the delay contingent on a full judicial consideration of the question
of jurisdiction may be untenable. In response, "the Court has built a body of
precedent which affords it the authority to indicate provisional measures if the
jurisdiction which has been pleaded appears, prima facie, to afford a basis on
which the Court's jurisdiction might be founded."3 o
The prima facie standard for jurisdiction is a less onerous burden than the
clear demonstration of jurisdiction that the Court requires at the merits stage.
Indeed, until the decision in the Legality of Use of Force cases in 1999, the
Court had never rejected a single request for provisional measures for lack of
prima facie jurisdiction.3 1 Further, in cases of great urgency-as in the Breard
case and its progeny that sought to enjoin the United States from executing
foreign nationals using the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations-the
urgency of issuing orders effectively lowered the already low jurisdictional
32
standard. In each of the Consular Relations cases, Judge Oda repeatedly
stated in his declarations that although he believed that "provisional
measures ... should not have been indicated[,] . . . [he] voted in favor of the
Order, for humanitarian reasons,"33 and thus effectively distanced his rationale
for granting provisional measures from any legal basis. Despite a nominally
formalized framework for jurisdictional analysis that already favors the
applicants, the overall effect of the ICJ's case law on provisional measures
seems to render the jurisdictional hurdle a non-issue at the provisional
measures stage.
One constraint on the seemingly broad availability of provisional
measures is that the requested interim measures must be incidental to the main
dispute that is to be litigated. As President Owada explained in a recent dissent
from a grant of provisional measures,
A request for the indication of provisional measures is made by one of the parties
29. Article 36, paragraph 6 provides, "in the event of a dispute as to whether the Court has
jurisdiction, the matter shall be settled by the decision of the Court." Statute of the International Court of
Justice art. 36, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 993.
30. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Provisional
Measures Order, 1984 I.C.J. 169, 206-07 (May 10) (dissenting opinion of Judge Schwebel).
31. See Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. U.S.), Provisional Measures Order, 1999
I.C.J. 916, 948 (June 2) (separate opinion of Judge Oda); see also Kaoru Obata, The Relevance of
Jurisdiction to Deal with the Merits to the Power to Indicate Interim Measures: A Critique of the Recent
Practice of the International Court of Justice, in I LIBER AMICORUM: JUDGE SHIGERU ODA 451, 451
(Nisuke Ando, Edward McWhinney & Riudiger Wolfrum eds., 2002) (noting that the cases "set a new
precedent," as it "was the first time a request was rejected for lack of prima facie basis ofjurisdiction").
32. Obata, supra note 31, at 457.
33. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), Provisional Measures Order,
1998 I.C.J. 248, 262 (Apr. 9) (declaration of Judge Oda); see also LaGrand (Ger. v. U.S.), Provisional
Measures Order, 1999 I.C.J. 9, 20 (Mar. 3) (declaration of Judge Oda) ("I voted in favour of the Order
solely for humanitarian reasons." (emphasis added)); Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v.
U.S.), Provisional Measures Order, 2003 I.C.J. 77, 93 (Feb. 5) (declaration of Judge Oda) ("[My] doubts
have already been clearly expressed . .. in connection with two similar cases decided by the Court.").
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during the course of the proceedings in the main case as its incidental proceedings.
As such, the scope of the request and the jurisdiction of the Court to deal with the
request is limited by its very nature to being incidental to the main case. 34
If provisional measures are conceived of as preventing irreparable harm to a
party's rights, requiring that the requested measures be incidental to the main
proceedings effectively limits the spectrum of rights and injuries the applying
party can claim at the provisional measures stage.
Pushing against this constraint, however, is the Court's relatively new
doctrinal innovation that provisional measures can protect "plausible rights."
First invoked in the 2009 case of Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite
(Belgium v. Senegal), in which the French text was authoritative,35 this
principle was institutionalized in the March 8, 2011 order in Costa Rica v.
Nicaragua in which the English text was authoritative. 36 As Judge Koroma
pointed out in his separate opinion in the latter case, "the plausibility
standard ... suffers from vagueness and ambiguity. It is unclear from the
Court's Order whether the Court requires an applicant seeking provisional
measures to demonstrate the plausibility of its legal rights, the plausibility of its
factual claims, or both."3 7 The plausibility standard "is inconsistent with the
settled jurisprudence of the Court, according to which the applicant has to
demonstrate that an existing right is threatened and needs to be protected, 38 a
much higher standard indeed. Despite the initial dissensus, however, the
Court's order in Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand) has firmly
settled the position of "plausibility" as a mainstay of provisional-measures
analysis. The Court in that case stated that it could "exercise [its] power [to
grant provisional measures] only if it is satisfied that the rights asserted by a
party are at least plausible."3 9 Although the panel filed five dissents, two
declarations (including one by Judge Koroma),40 and one separate opinion,
there was no disagreement about the majority's use of the plausibility standard
34. Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 15 June 1962 in the Case Concerning the
Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thai.), Provisional Measures Order, 1 (July 18, 2011)
(dissenting opinion of President Owada), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/151/16566.pdf.
35. See Questions Relating to the Obligation To Prosecute or Extradite (BeIg. v. Sen.),
Provisional Measures Order, 2009 I.C.J. 139, T 57 (May 28) ("[T]he power of the Court to indicate
provisional measures should be exercised only if the Court is satisfied that the rights asserted by a party
are at least plausible.").
36. See Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicar.),
Provisional Measures Order, T 53-54 (Mar. 8, 2011), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/150/16324.pdf
("[T]he Court may exercise this power [to indicate provisional measures] only if it is satisfied that the
rights asserted by a party are at least plausible."). The only cited authority for the quoted proposition is
the former case.
37. Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua),
Provisional Measures Order, T 12 (Mar. 8, 2011) (separate opinion of Judge Koroma), http://www.icj-cij
.org/docket/files/1 50/16326.pdf.
38. Id. 6.
39. Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 15 June 1962 in the Case Concerning the
Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thai.), Provisional Measures Order, T 33 (July 18, 2011)
(declaration of Judge Koroma), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/151/16564.pdf.
40. Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 15 June 1962 in the Case Concerning the
Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thai.), Provisional Measures Order (July 18, 2011) (declaration
of Judge Koroma), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/151/16568.pdf.
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in its analysis. As one commentator put it, in the aftermath of these three cases,
plausibility is "now a distinct element [of provisional-measures analysis] and
black-letter law." 41
Formally, then, an applicant for provisional measures must demonstrate
that the Court has prima facie jurisdiction over the parties, that the rights sought
to be protected are incidental-and now plausible-and that urgency demands
the grant of provisional measures. This Section showed that the applicant's
actual burden appears to be much less demanding than the Court's formal
framework may suggest. The next Section turns from the ICJ's legalistic
analysis of provisional measures to the major extralegal problems that beset
applications for, and the grants of, provisional measures.
II. PROBLEMS OF PROVISIONAL MEASURES
This Part considers two specific problems that plague provisional
measures: their spotty compliance record and the possibilities of their abuse.
A. Compliance
One aspect of provisional-measures jurisprudence that remained
controversial until the ICJ's decision in LaGrand was whether provisional
measures were binding on the parties or merely advisory. Scholars had long
been divided on the issue42 and some state parties had found it convenient to
treat interim orders as non-binding.4 3 The Court itself had, until LaGrand,
refrained from making a definitive statement one way or another. In LaGrand,
however, the ICJ made an emphatic and pointed declaration that "orders on
provisional measures under Article 41 have binding effect,"" a statement it has
since affirmed in subsequent cases.45
Considerations of the binding nature of international legal obligations
inevitably lead to an analysis of their concomitant enforcement and
compliance. On the question of compliance, Constanze Schulte notes a "big
difference between the negative record for provisional measures and the largely
positive one for judgments." 46 Given that the provisional measures always
favor the applicant and are issued against a respondent who almost always
41. Jacob Katz Cogan, Current Developments: The 2011 Judicial Activity of the International
Court ofJustice, 106 AM. J. INT'L L. 586, 599 (2012).
42. See Jorg Kammerhofer, The Binding Nature of Provisional Measures of the International
Court of Justice: the 'Settlement' of the Issue in the LaGrand Case, 16 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 67, 68-72
(2003).
43. See, e.g., Letter from Madeleine K. Albright, U.S. Sec'y of State, to the Honorable James
S. Gilmore II, Governor of Va. (Apr. 13, 1998), in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONTEMPORARY
PERSPECTIVE 120 (W. Michael Reisman et al. eds., 2004) (describing provisional-measures "injunction"
against the United States in the ICJ's Breard decision as "non-binding").
44. LaGrand (Ger. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 1 109 (June 27).
45. See, e.g., Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination (Geor. v. Russ.), Provisional Measures Order, 2008 I.C.J. 353, 397 (Oct. 15);
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Congo v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 168, 258 (Dec. 19).
46. CONSTANZE SCHULTE, COMPLIANCE WITH DECISIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF
JUSTICE 418 (2004).
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challenges the Court's very jurisdiction over the present dispute, it appears
perfectly logical for the respondent to refuse to comply with provisional
measures. As Schulte notes, "where provisional measures are indicated in cases
of joint submission, there is a greater likelihood of compliance." 47 Some
respondents may comply with provisional measures because they, like some
commentators,48 believe that the finding of prima facie jurisdiction serves as an
indication of the likely outcome on the jurisdictional finding at the merits stage.
Another reading, indeed the officially endorsed reading, is that the Court may
reject jurisdiction at the merits stage despite a finding of prima facie
jurisdiction at the provisional measures stage.49 On this account, however, a
respondent nation that feels particularly strongly about the jurisdictional
question would likely also hold out on compliance with provisional measures
that it believes the Court has no power to declare.
If international adjudicatory bodies like the ICJ have power to demand
compliance, they do so on the basis of the respective parties' consent.so
Declarations of what are in effect injunctions in the absence of consent violates
the most fundamental principles of international adjudication, and the practice
of provisional measures may be the most normalized exception to the same.
Normalized as they may be, and despite definitive declarations of their binding
nature, provisional measures will likely always face compliance problems in
the absence of consent from both parties. The Kishenganga Panel's repeated
reliance on India's explicit promise to comply with any and all orders issued at
the provisional measures stage, for instance, likely signals the Panel's implicit
recognition of the importance of consent in ensuring that provisional measures
prove to be effective.5 1
B. Abuse
The "abuse" of provisional measures refers to their use for purposes other
than maintaining the status quo or preventing irreparable harm pendente lite. In
particular, the concern is with their strategic use by the applicant to the
detriment of the respondent in the absence of any good faith legal basis for the
same. Although, formally, either party can request provisional measures,
practice has conclusively established the unilateral character of provisional-
measures applications, with the reins firmly in the hands of the applicant. Hugh
Thirlway wrote in 1994, "a trend has been observed over the last 20 years or so
47. SCHULTE, supra note 46, at 420. See generally id. at 418-35.
48. See, e.g., Karin Oellers-Frahm, Use and Abuse of Interim Protection Before International
Courts and Tribunals, in COEXISTENCE, COOPERATION AND SOLIDARITY: LIBER AMICORUM RODIGER
WOLFRUM 1685, 1685 (Holger Hestermeyer et al. eds., 2012).
49. In the Interhandel case, for example, the ICJ did not prejudge jurisdiction at the
provisional-measures stage, but rejected jurisdiction at the merits stage. Interhandel (Switz. v. U.S.),
1959 I.C.J. 6 (Mar. 21).
50. See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 36, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S.
No. 993.
51. Indeed, the entirety of Section IV.A of the Court's analysis is devoted to "India's
Assurances and Representations." Kishenganga Order, supra note 4, T 121-27.
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for proceedings to be instituted before the Court in circumstances . .. to obtain
the short-term tactical advantage of an order indicating provisional orders." 52
Thirlway's observation remains relevant today. For example, in a recent
article, Karin Oellers-Frahm suggests that there are two main forms of
provisional measures abuse, which have become part of a "litigation strategy":
first, the interim orders are used to assess the strength of the case from the
Court's perspective, and second, initiating the litigation gives the applicant a
public platform to address the international community.53 Neither purpose is
recognized as a legitimate end of provisional measures. At the same time as the
Court must find a way to secure the rights of applicants, it must also protect the
rights of respondents and safeguard them from abuse. Article 41's use of the
disjunctive "either" in authorizing the Court to take provisional measures "to
preserve the rights of either party,"54 should not come to mean "one party,
paradigmatically the applicant, to the exclusion of the other."
Indeed, even in not declaring provisional measures, the Court may still
effect a considerable coercive force on a protesting nation. In the Great Belt
case, for example, although the Court refrained from granting provisional
measures, it implicitly threatened Denmark with the possibility of a sizeable
loss to the exchequer if it continued with its planned construction. That is the
focus of the next Part.
III. THE GREATBELT"PRINCIPLE" RECONSIDERED
Thinking of provisional measures only through the lens of strategic action
may occlude the important functions they serve in their good-faith application.
If one approaches the analysis of the Great Belt case's "proceed at your own
risk" statement with a deeply held conviction about every applicant's good-
faith legal basis for requesting provisional measures, the principle may appear
just and equitable. After all, in advising Denmark that it was "proceeding at
[its] own risk" the Court did no more than put the respondent on notice that
while the prescription of provisional measures may be unwarranted, the Court
may still order the undoing of any subsequent actions that it later finds to
violate the applicant's legally-guaranteed rights. Indeed, that the Court should
give the respondent State fair notice of the possibility of a subsequent adverse
finding speaks in favor of its application and its inherent fairness. In my view,
however, the promulgation of the Great Belt Court's statement into a principle
or rule of international law only heightens the risk of unilateral abuse to which
provisional measures seem so inherently susceptible.
52. Hugh Thirlway, The Indication of Provisional Measures by the International Court of
Justice, in INTERIM MEASURES INDICATED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS 1, 27 (Rudolf Berhardt ed.,
1994).
53. Oellers-Frahm, supra note 48, at 1686.
54. See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 41, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S.
No. 993.
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A. Is It Really a Principle ofInternational Law?
The ur-statement of the principle declared in the Kishenganga Order
reads, "in principle ... if it is established that the construction of works
involves an infringement of a legal right, the possibility cannot and should not
be excluded a priori of a judicial finding that such works must not be continued
or must be modified or dismantled."s
None of the major writings on provisional measures in the aftermath of
the Great Belt case-and there has been a substantial amount in the past decade
alone 5-identifies the ICJ's statement here as an articulation of an
international legal principle.
Mehmet Semih Gemalmaz's account of Great Belt, for one, does not refer
to this statement at all. The important, if not the only, takeaway from this case
for Gemalmaz is the more routine issue of the role of urgency in deciding
whether or not a grant of provisional measures is warranted.58
In Shabtai Rosenne's meticulous recounting of the legal principles in all
provisional measures decisions by the ICJ, the discussion of the Great Belt case
makes no mention of the Court's remark above as the founding declaration of a
legal principle. Rather, Rosenne characterizes this statement as "advice,"
asserting that, "the Court tendered some advice to each party, which assisted
them in reaching an agreed solution of the dispute."59 Rosenne goes on to
defend the Court against charges that "in giving advice of this nature or in
making general statements 'at large' . . . in orders on provisional measures the
Court is exceeding its functions, which are limited to declaring the law."60
Rosenne argues that giving such advice is perfectly acceptable if such
"pronouncements lead to the settlement of the dispute outside the Court," as
happened in this case, for, as an organ of the United Nations, the Court may
"take any action that furthers the maintenance of international peace." 6' In thus
describing the Court's statement, Rosenne implicitly, but definitively, accepts
his opponents' characterization of the same as extralegal. That this extralegal
advice is converted into a "principle of international law" should at the very
least give pause.
Karin Oellers-Frahm sees the Great Belt case as an instance where the
Court's rejection of provisional measures gave both parties "a first signal
concerning the outcome of the case."62 Her reading reveals the Court's decision
not to grant provisional measures, at the same time as it put respondent
Denmark on notice that it might later undo any construction on the bridge that
55. Passage Through the Great Belt (Fin. v. Den.), Provisional Measures Order, 1991 I.C.J. 12,
T 31 (July 29).
56. See supra note 20.
57. See GEMALMAZ, supra note 16, at 224-25.
58. Id. at 224.
59. ROSENNE, supra note 20, at 213.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See Oellers-Frahm, supra note 48, at 1687.
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Denmark undertook, as a strategic and ultimately coercive one. She establishes
a causative link between the Court's "clear indication . . . that an order to
dismantle ... could not be ruled out" and Denmark's willingness to negotiate a
settlement. In Oeller-Frahm's reading, Denmark negotiates a settlement "[a]s
this possibility [of future dismantling] was highly unwelcome."" Like other
commentators, Oellers-Frahm's analysis of the case does not seem to recognize
or even suggest that the Court was spelling out a legal principle here. In fact,
she finds it necessary to justify the Court's actions just as Rosenne did: There is
no abuse of provisional measures here because the Court's decision
"contributed to and facilitated the direct and friendly peaceful settlement of the
dispute." 65
If the happy gloss that a "peaceful settlement" necessarily puts on all
analysis is removed, Oellers-Frahm's reading reveals the unprecedented nature
of the Court's coercive power here. The disjunction is between what the Court
formally says and to what that functionally amounts. Even though, formally, it
did not indicate provisional measures, the Court was still able to functionally
give the applicant, Finland, the same outcome as if it had issued the requested
provisional measures. For both Rosenne and Oellers-Frahm, however, the
"peaceful settlement" is an important part of the analysis because they seem to
read the Court's statement in the case to apply very specifically and narrowly to
this particular case. They do not read the ICJ decision in Great Belt, as the
Kishenganga Panel ultimately does, as a broad, all-encompassing principle of
international law. Given that the ICJ itself has not recognized what Rosenne
calls its "judicial dicta" 66 in the case as a principle of international law, where,
apart from applicant Pakistan's repeated assertions to that effect, does the
Kishenganga Panel derive the authority for such an unprecedented declaration?
The answer is simple, but instructive: the Kishenganga Order declares the
"proceed at your own risk" principle to be one of international law because
India, on the last day of the hearings, stated that it "[wa]s committed to proceed
on 'the own-risk principle' of international law"67 --because of consent. A look
at the text in which the Panel declares the "proceed at your own risk" principle
one of international law reveals the centrality of India's consent to the Panel's
determination:
[T]he continuation of such activity is appropriately governed by the "proceed at
own risk" principle of international law, as specifically recognized by India during
the hearing. The situation would merely be one in which India would have invested
considerable sums of money without reaping the benefit of the operation of the
KHEP as currently envisaged. This, however, is precisely the risk that India has




66. See ROSENNE, supra note 20, at 213 (explaining "judicial dicta" as "not part of the ratio
but relevant to a collateral matter").
67. Kishenganga Order, supra note 4, 70.
68. Id. 1 143 (emphasis added).
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Had India not accepted the principle advanced by Pakistan, and had it not given
"unequivocal assurance" of compliance to the Panel-both decisions in which
India likely did not realistically have an alternative choice in light of the slow
but certain improvement in Indo-Pakistani relations-it is unlikely that the
Panel would have so calmly declared a new principle of international law as
well as "threatened" India with potential losses of "considerable sums of
money" to the exchequer. In any case, it is not clear that Pakistan's or India's
acceptance of the principle, either jointly or severally, should be enough to bind
the entire international community through the force of custom.69
If this principle were to be invoked by future applicants for provisional
measures as a matter of norm in cases of contested construction, the applicant
may get the benefit of the requested measures even if the Court does not
explicitly grant them, and even if the Court ultimately finds its jurisdiction to
be unfounded. Despite the Court's formal judgment, then, an applicant may
always obtain the functional outcome it desires. Indeed, the "proceed at your
own risk" principle appears to encourage, even invite, abuse.
B. Moving Beyond a Problematic Principle ofinternational Law
By converting the Great Belt principle into a rule of "international law,"
the Panel has ensured that State A can now functionally enjoin any construction
or similar activities by State B to which it objects through the very institution of
proceedings against State B-irrespective of merit-when the application is
accompanied by a request for provisional measures. If State B is rational it will
willingly suspend all further activity that is complained of for fear of the "risk
of proceeding" and its associated costs. This injunctive power, however
temporary its benefits may actually be, does violence to the rights of, not the
applicant, but the respondent while the litigation is pending. It opens the
possibility for flagrant abuse such that the concept of the preservation of party
rights is turned on its head as far as State B is concerned. This is an extralegal
power in the hands of State A that strains the consensual foundations of
international adjudication. Particularly in cases like the Kishenganga dispute
where the stakes are so high-vast sums are lost due to delayed completion, the
environmental damage is acute, and the political costs on both sides of the
border are immense o-a practicable framework is needed that both ensures the
viability of provisional measures for the important purpose they serve, and
curbs their abuse. The "proceed at own risk" principle is not part of that
framework.
Given the acute applicant-bias provisional-measures adjudication already
suffers from, any reform in conceiving of a practicable framework for their
adjudication will need to strike an appropriate balance in the respondent's
69. It remains unclear whether the "proceed at own risk" principle falls under international
custom or general principles.
70. See Manav Bhatnagar, Reconsidering the Indus Waters Treaty, 22 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 271
(2009).
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favor. In the narrow context of a construction dispute, the most effective
solution would be for the Court to follow a multi-prong test that the applicant
must satisfy before interim measures are granted. The applicant should have the
burden of demonstrating jurisdiction-not merely a prima facie showing.
Further, the rights that the applicant seeks to preserve must be clearly shown to
be justiciable by the adjudicatory body and not merely "plausible." While
urgency is a central concern in regular provisional-measures adjudication, such
concerns are likely negligible in the construction context.7 1 Strict adherence to
such requirements would stem possibilities of flagrant abuse. If the "proceed at
your own risk" principle is introduced as an additional protection to the
applicant, the entire jurisdictional analysis would amount to naught, and an
applicant's very act of application would accrue unjustifiable coercive force
against the respondent.
The preceding discussion seems to sidestep one fundamental question:
How, precisely, is a Court to carry out such a test? One equitable approach
would be for the Court to undertake a much more fact-specific inquiry at the
provisional measures stage itself that would allow it to make a definitive
judgment about whether to grant interim relief. Where the Court, like the
Kishenganga Panel, cannot make such a definitive judgment, the Court should
deny interim relief, without any reference to the likes of a "proceed at your own
risk" principle. Nothing would prevent the Court from declaring the
respondent's activities unlawful and ordering their destruction at the final
merits stage.72 Such an approach would, however, prevent the very application
for provisional measures from gathering coercive force, and allow the
respondent to make its own independent cost-benefit analysis. Courts could, in
this way, stymie the abuse of provisional measures.
IV. CONCLUSION
If the "proceed at your own risk principle" becomes completely
institutionalized, the allocation of risk in any future adjudicated dispute
between two nations over construction will always fall directly on the
respondent the moment an applicant files for provisional measures. Irrespective
of the adjudicatory body's ultimate decision on the grant or denial of such
measures, the very act of requesting provisional measures may come to acquire
injunctive force as the respondent necessarily bears the cost of potentially
undoing all its work. The applicant bias that provisional measures already
suffer from on account of the low bar for finding jurisdiction, and the relatively
new "plausibility" doctrine, will become only more extreme if the "Great Belt
71. "Urgency" can be said to exist in the construction context to the extent that provisional
measures are needed to prevent irreparable damage that continuing construction might cause. In such a
case, a court should grant provisional measures as the Kishenganga Panel did when it enjoined India
from constructing the dam portion of the KHEP. Kishenganga Order, supra note 4, T 147.
72. The Kishenganga Panel, however, ultimately allowed India to proceed with its
construction, subject to conditions in its final award, which is still forthcoming as of this publication.
Indus Waters Kishenganga Arbitration (Pak. v. India), Partial Award, 1201 (2013).
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principle" gains wide acceptance. This Comment is written in the hope that it
does not.
